Foreword by St. Antoine, Theodore J.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Other Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2005 
Foreword 
Theodore J. St. Antoine 
University of Michigan Law School 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/176 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
St. Antoine, Theodore J. Foreword to The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the 
American Workplace, by C. J. Morris, xi-xiv. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, (2005). 
This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized 
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
The Blue Eagle at Work 
Reclaiming Democratic Rights 
in the American Workplace 
CHARLES J. MORRIS 
With a Foreword by 
Theodore J. St. Antoine 
/LR Press, an imprint of 
Cornell University Press 
ITHACA AND LONDON 
Foreword 
Specialists in any field have a vested interest in their mastery of the subject. 
Expertise, after all, is their stock in trade. Assaults on the conventional wis-
dom can be unnerving if not discrediting. In the pages that follow, such an 
experience awaits all conscientious readers with a labor background who 
dare to expose themselves to Professor Charles Morris's provocative, icono-
clastic, and ultimately persuasive arguments. He insists that a half-century 
of American labor law thinking has gone astray in failing to recognize the 
duty of an employer to bargain with a labor union representing less than a 
majority of the firm's employees. 1 While the experts will have a field day with 
the pros and cons, the general reader will have no trouble following Mor-
ris's well-honed prose. Anyone can gain much insight into this important if 
neglected legal issue. 
Every labor specialist knows that the American law of collective bargain-
ing is unique. One feature of this uniqueness is the concept of exclusive rep-
resentation. Once a union has the support of a majority of the employees in 
an appropriate unit, it is the sole bargaining agent for all the employees in 
the unit. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) requires employers to 
bargain with a majority union concerning the terms of employment of all the 
unit's workers. That even includes employees who may vigorously oppose 
the majority union. This system of exclusive representation is justified on 
such grounds as industrial stability and predictability, worker solidarity, and 
employer convenience. 
In the absence of a majority union exercising exclusive authority, the law 
allows an employer to bargain with a union that represents only a minority 
of the employees. Such negotiations can cover the union's own members and 
can lead to what is commonly called a members-only contract. But some time 
in the first decades after the passage of the Wagner Act, the original NLRA, 
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in 19 3 5, it became generally accepted by labor practitioners and scholars 
that employers had no statutory duty to bargain with a minority union. "Ma-
jority rule" did not allude merely to exclusive representation; it referred to 
the only kind of status that conveyed legal obligations. 
In 1990, into this seemingly settled scene, stepped that imaginative legal 
thinker and doughty champion of workers' rights, Professor Clyde Sum-
mers.2 Summers contended that in the analysis of workers' bargaining rights, 
too much emphasis had been placed on Section 9(a) of the NLRA, which 
makes a majority union the "exclusive representative" of all the employees 
in a bargaining unit. In Summers's view this obscured the even more funda-
mental provision of Section 7, entitling employees to "bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing." 
Section 7 draws no distinctions between majority unions and minority 
unions. For Summers this meant that when no exclusive representative is pres-
ent, an employer should be obligated to bargain with a union representing 
less than a majority of a unit's employees. Yet even Summers conceded: "We 
have probably proceeded too long on the questionable assumption that the 
employer has no affirmative duty to bargain with a nonmajority union to 
now recognize that duty short of a statutory amendment." 3 
Professor Morris will have none of this temporizing. His is no quixotic 
quest for some shimmering, unattainable ideal. A former labor practitioner 
himself, Morris is a hard-headed realist who aims for a practical, viable the-
ory that can be sold to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the 
courts. So he has dug deep into the legislative history of the NLRA and its 
predecessor, the National Industrial Recover Act (NIRA). He has also 
scoured the early Labor Board and judicial decisions that touch on the issue 
of minority-union bargaining, as well as the major Supreme Court pro-
nouncements that might have some bearing on the question. His exhaustive 
research efforts have borne rich fruit. 
Morris meets head-on the notion that a minority union has no legal bar-
gaining rights and can negotiate on behalf of its members only at the suffer-
ance of the employer. He says he "can report with assurance" that there is 
not a single NLRB or court decision holding any such thing. The case law 
reveals the issue has never been squarely faced and resolved. Turning to the 
positive side, Morris demonstrates convincingly that minority-union bar-
gaining and members-only contracts were common sights in the labor rela-
tions landscape at the time the NIRA and the NLRA were adopted. There is 
not the slightest indication that Congress intended to change that situation. 
Perhaps Morris's most personal contribution is his lovingly detailed re-
construction of the world of the NIRA and its Blue Eagle, and the subsequent 
developments leading to the enactment of the NLRA. Context can be cru-
cial in the interpretation of a statute. What Morris shows is that minority-
union bargaining was taken for granted during the critical period of the 
1930s. Indeed, members-only contracts were as common as majority-exclu-
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sivity contracts, and more so in such major industries as steel and auto. 
Wouldn't Congress have addressed the issue if it felt that employers were not 
required to engage in this frequent and sometimes favored form of negotia-
tion? Yet the legislative history contains not a hint of disapproval of minor-
ity-union bargaining. And the plain language of Section 7 of the NLRA, 
unchanged from Section 7(a) of the NIRA and unchanged to this very day, 
says without qualification or limitation that "[e]mployees" have the "right" 
to "bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. "4 
There is no suggestion whatsoever that employees lose this right if they can-
not get a majority of their fellows to go along. 
Why, then, did the conventional view take hold that employers have a 
duty to bargain only with majority unions? Morris is convincing on this as 
well. He points out that in the first decade after the passage of the Wagner 
Act in I 9 3 5, unions won over 8 5 percent of the representation elections and 
card-checks conducted by the NLRB. This quick and easy route to recogni-
tion meant a majority union was now entitled to exclusive bargaining au-
thority under Section 9(a). Members-only recognition fell into disuse and 
memories of its prior prominence soon faded. By 1945 a labor leader quoted 
by Morris even voiced the opinion that employers could only recognize ma-
jority unions. 
The Morris thesis confronts two big hurdles. The first, cited by Professor 
Summers, is that for more than half a century the contrary proposition has 
been accepted. Inertia can be a force in the law. Morris responds, correctly, 
that civil rights rulings both older and clearer than minority-bargaining prin-
ciples have been reversed when their errors became manifest. These days, 
however, labor claims may not be accorded the same high priority as civil 
rights. The second objection is a practical one. It is entirely possible that two 
or more hostile minority unions might assert competing bargaining rights in 
the same unit. That could cause factional divisions among the workforce and 
serious operational difficulties for an employer. Morris believes, and I agree, 
that those problems could be worked out. But the NLRB and the courts can 
be expected to scrutinize such functional factors with a wary eye. 
Finally, what might have been an intriguing but redundant modus operandi 
in the 1940s and 1950s could assume great practical significance in the cur-
rent industrial relations climate. With union density in the private sector now 
dipping below IO percent, the unique American institution of collective bar-
gaining, with all its capacity for economic and humane contributions to our 
society, stands in need of major rehabilitation. The requirement of minority-
union recognition might be the very ingredient to jump-start the process. If 
the sequence follows that of the 1930s-minority-union bargaining leading 
to full-scale majority-exclusivity contracts-that will be all to the good. In 
today's increasingly polarized world, we tend to forget the benefits that a 
mature, cooperative union-management relationship can bring to the work-
place. Management is invariably best qualified to direct the overall enter-
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prise. The workers in the shop, however, are often better able to determine just 
how a particular operation should be performed. 
When Professor Morris first broached his theory about minority-union 
bargaining, I was close to total skepticism. Most of us are unreceptive to 
what appears completely at odds with widespread basic understandings. 
Some will say we have enough difficult questions in the labor field, legal and 
otherwise, to deal with as it is. But Morris is like an irresistible force-and, 
more important, he is a thorough researcher, a keen analyst, and a persua-
sive writer. His remarkable, salutary message deserves our fullest attention. 
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE 
